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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN N. HALL, and
RITA M. HALL,
Plaintiffs'Respondents,
vs.
PERRY G. FITZGERALD,
CAROLYN S. FITZGERALD, et al.
Defendants-Appellants.
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)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
18371

)

)
)

)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by the sellers of real property to treat a uniform
real estate contract as a note and mortgage, to have the property sold at
a foreclosure sale, and for judgment against the buyers for the deficiency.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties entered into a uniform real estate contract dated
December 30, 1977, whereby plaintiffs sold to defendants 1 ,840 acres of
undeveloped land in Cedar Valley, Utah County, for $460,000.00, payable
$90,116.00 down and $40,000 annually until December 30, 1986, when the
entire balance was payable (R 6,7).

Defendants made the down payment and

the annual payments in 1978 and 1979 (R 3, paragraph 5).

Defendants paid

$500.00 on October 15, 1980, but did not pay the balance of the annual
payment due on December 30, 1980 (R 11).

Plaintiffs filed suit in May
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-21981, after negotiations to settle the matter otherwise were unsuccessful (R 2-4).

Defendants in their Answer denied that Exhibit B to

plaintiffs' Complaint was the contract entered into tecause it did not
have a provision requiring plaintiffs as sellers to deed to defendants
as buyers part of the land purchased when the annual payments were made
(called release clauses) (R 11).

Before any discovery was undertaken by

either side, plaintiffs moved on September 18, 1981, for a summary judgment
based on an affidavit of the plaintiff husband and the attorney for
plaintiffs (R 12).

On September 28, 1981, defendants moved to amend their
..

Answer to assert a breach of the subject contract by plaintiffs (failure
to pay plaintiffs' seller $30,000.00 due on the contract referred to in
paragraph No. 6 of Exhibit B referred to above) and to reform the subject
contract to set forth the release provision referred to above (R8'·5!).
Without expressly ruling on defendants' Motion to Amend and without oral
argument, the lower court entered a Judgment and Order for $401 ,464.71
on November 23, 1981 (R 29, 30).

Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside

Judgment on November 27, 1981 (R 32,33) on the following four grounds:
(1)

defendants' Motion to amend their Answer had not been ruled upon;

(2) newly discovered evidence (defendants' payment of $40,000.00 to
plaintiffs' sellers had been applied by them to plaintiffs' contract so
plaintiffs had the benefit of that sum which was in fact an acceptance
of the only payment due as a breach upon which the judgment was predicated;
(3) judgment was not supported by a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as required by Rule 56(d) of U.R.C.P.; (4) the judgment violated Sec.
78-37-1, 2, U.C.A., 1953, as no money judgment is proper until after a
sale of the property security as the proceeds might extinguish the debt.
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The denial of that motion resulted in the Judgment of November 23, 1981,
becoming final.

The facts in support of the Motion last referred to and

in support of both the Answer and the Proposed Amended Answer have never
been found as there has been no evidentiary hearing needed to establish
their existence or non-existence.

Affidavit

Leland

A. Fitzgerald, plaintiffs' seller, generally supportsthese factual claims
(R79).

They were filed after the Summary Judgment but before the hearing

on the Motion to Set Aside.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The lower court granted plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on
November 23, 1981, without oral argument.
to set aside that judgment.

Defendants Fitzgerald moved

The latter motion was denied on March 11,

1982 (R 44).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the Judgment and Order of November 23, 1981,
set aside, permit their proposed Amended Answer to be filed and to proceed
to trial on the merits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED A SUMMARY JUDGMENT ALTHOUGH
THERE WERE MATERIAL FACTS CONCERNING WHICH THERE WAS A GENUINE
DISPUTE, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THE CONTRACT SUED UPON WAS THE
CONTRACT THE PARTIES HAD ENTERED INTO SINCE IT HAD NO RELEASE
PROVISION AND WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ACCEPTED THE PAYMENT
MADE BY APPELLANTS TO KEEP THEIR OWN CONTRACT CURRENT AND
THUS CURED THE BREACH ON WHICH THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED.
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I n their answer of July 8, 1981, the appellants expressly alleged
that the contract sued upon was not the contract entered into by the
parties because the contract sued upon did not contain a "release provision 11
(R 11).

This clear denial of paragraph 2 of plaintiff's Complaint created

a factual dispute which was most material to this lawsuit.

There is

nothing in the affidavit of either Calvin Hall, one of the respondents
(R 14, 15) or in the affidavit of his attorney, Richard A. Rappaport
(R 20, 21) which addresses this factual dispute at all.

Such was the state

of the record at the time the summary judgment was entered on November 23,
1981 (R 29, 30).

To deny appellants their opportunity to prove their

factual assertions was error.

Numberous decisions of this Court establish

this proposition beyond dispute.

Illustrative are the following recent

cases on this point:
In re Williams Estate, 10 Ut. 2d 83,348 P 2d 683 (1960)
Anderson v. Granite Schoo 1 District, 413 P 2d 596 ( 1966)
McBride v. Jones, 615 P 2d 432 (1980)
Foster v. Salt Lake County, 632 P 2d 810 (1981)

POINT II
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT NOT TO GRANT A TRIAL ON THE
BASIS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH CAME TO LIGHT AFTER
THE ENTRY OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The judgment in question was predicated upon the failure of appellants
to pay $40,000 on December 30, 1980.

That amount was paid by appellants

to Leland A. Fitzgerald, respondents' seller, who requested that it be
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paid directly to him as he was fearful that respondents would not pay
him the $30,000 due him on the contract referred to in paragraph 6 of
the subject contract ( R~,7).

After the entry of the summary judgment

in question, it came to appellants' attention that the respondents had
utilized most, if not all, of the payment respondents made to preserve
their interest in the subject property.

Appellants timely moved to

have the judgment appealed from set aside on the basis of that evidence
( R 34, 35).

No case has been found which deals with a new trial when there was
not an initial trial because a surrrnary judgment proceeding was involved
but the same principles of requiring the final resolution to reflect
all_ the facts bearing on the merits should be as applicable to this
case as to any other.

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR THE BALANCE
OF THE PURCHASE PRICE PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 16C OF THE UNIFORM
. REAL ESTATE CONTRACT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION AND PROOF
BY RESPONDENTS THAT THEY FULFILLED THE TERMS OF SAID CONTRACT
BY "PASS TITLE TO BUYER SUBJECT THERET0.

11

Respondents did not allege that they had passed title to appellants,
only that they "tender title to buyer subject to said note and mortgage"
( R 3, paragraph 9).

11

•

•

•

far a party to recover upon a contract for

nonperformance by the other party, he must establish his own performance
or his offer and ability to perform or a valid excuse for his failure to
perform" (Contracts, Sec. 355, 17 Am. Jur_., 2d 791).

Here the offer

to perform is not sufficient as the contract requires that the ~~ti-tle
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pass." Respondents .did not allege they held title to said property.
In fact they would not acquire title until they paid off the $297,377
due Leland A. and Helen S. Fitzgerald on a uniform real estate contract
referred to in paragraph 6 of the subject contract.

Thus their complaint

failed to state a cause of action and the Rule 12(h) of U.R.C.P. provides
that the defense of failure to state a claim is not waived by failure to
raise it by motion or in the answer.

It could still be raised at a trial

on the merits, a stage never reached in this case and for which this
appeal is being prosecuted.
Even if respondents held the title subject to the lien of the
Fitzgeralds referred to above, the title which they must transfer to
appellants to enforce 16C would be a good marketable title not one
subject to an encumbrance and certainly not to one of the magnitude in
question.

To prevail on this point, respondents would have to contend

that a deed which purported to pass title even by those who had not
received a deed themselves from the record title holder suffices to
rreet the contract terms and even if those grantors owe hundreds of
thousands of dollars which must be paid off before the title is a
marketable one.

Such a proposition is so utterly unreasonable that

appellants' counsel has made but a cursory search for a case in point.
If the judgment in question is affirmed, respondents will have or
may acquire (l) all the interest in the land they

~ver

had (since no

one would pay anything but a nominal sum for the appellants' interest
which would be subject to the aforesaid $279,327 due to the bottom having
fallen out of real estate of the type in question)(2) the full purchase price
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$170~000

paid prior to this suit.

Of course, courts can not

make their determinations dependent upon economic factors.

However,

they can insist on both sound principle and precedents that the seller
of realty convey good title thereto before they will enforce a contractual provision allowing judgment for the full price less payments
made.

If the price is to be full price, the title for which the price

is payable must be full title.

The cases so hold.

The key word in

paragraph l 6C of the subject contract is "title." Words and Phrases
under"Title - to Property on page 380 cites·Gillespie v. Broas, N. Y., 23 Barb
11

370, 381, U. S. v. Hunter, 21 F. 615, 617 and Langmede v. Weaver, 60 NE
992 , 997 , 65 0hi o St . 17 as 1ea di ng cases on th e mean i ng of "ti t 1e . " In
Gillespie the court said "Title of itself to real estate implies an estate
in fee; nothing short is a complete title."

In U. S. v. Hunter the

court said:
. . . A leasehold interest may be considered, for some
purposes, a title, and sometimes the word "title" is used
in a general sense so as to include any title or interest,
and thus a mere leasehold interest; but here it is the
title, and this, in common acceptance, means the fu,,--and
absolute title; for when we speak of a man as having title
to certain lands, the ordinary understanding is that he is
the owner of the fee and not that he is a mere lessee; . . .
In Langmede the court said:
. . . The Century Dictionary defines the word "convey"
to mean, in law, "to pass title by deed," and the word
"title to mean the "ownership; absolute ownership; the
unincumbered fee. 11 So that the petition sufficiently shows
that Esselstein acquired the title to the land by legal
conveyance, and that the possession of his tenants was
lawfully held . . .
11

All these cases are ancient cases but the principles therein are
aa true today as in 1856 with respect to the meaning of "title.

11

It is evident that the respondent sellers did not fulfill the
contract provisions of paragraph 16C as they never received title and
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therefore could not convey title and even if they had title that title
could not be encumbered by a lien of some $297 ,000 and "pass title" within
the meaning of the contract terms.

To permit judgment on such performance

as the deed in this file (R gl.f ) was error.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR $401 ,464.71 PRIOR TO THE
TIME THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS SOLD AND THE RETURN SHOWS A BALANCE
REMAINING DUE.
In the case of First National Bank of Coalville vs. Boley, 61 P 2d 623
(1936), this court said:
We have held that under these sections there is no personal
liability by the mortgagor until after a foreclosure sale of
the security, and then only for the deficiency remaining unpaid,
and that a mortgagee may not have a personal judgment against a
mortgagor until the security has been first exhausted. See
Zions Sav. Bank &Trust Co. v. Rouse, 86 Utah, 574, 47 P (2d)
617; Blue Creek Land & Live Stock Co. ~- Kehrer, 60 Utah, 62 206 P 287.
In the Zions case referred to above Justice Wolfe in his concurring
opinion explained the effect of the subject statute (then Sec. 104-55-1
R.S. 1933) as follows:
Consequently, it transpires that not only must there be but
one action for the recovery of the debt, but that the judgment
obtained in said action must first provide for the sale of the
security, unless proper allegation and proof is made that the
security has become valueless, and that the only personal judgment
that can be obtained is a deficiency judgment. This is a judgment
obtained in the one action according to the provisions of that
chapter and in no other way.
Here the lower court did not confine its Judgment of November 23,
1981 (R 29, 30) to 11 adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursement,
and th e s a 1e of the mortgage property 11 as prov i de d i n Sec . 78- 37- 1 , but
entered a personal judgment against the appellant defendants which was
docketed in violation of Sec. 78-37-2 which provides. that the personal
judgment "must then be docketed" (emphasis added), the "then" clearly
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referring to the time when "if it appears from the return of the officer
making the sale that the proceeds are insufficient as a balance still
remaining due.''

The withholding of a personal judgment to the latter

time is essential as. a practical matter to enforce the statutory mandate
of Sec. 78-37-2 that "no general execution shall issue until after the
sale of the mortgaged property and the application of the amount realized
as aforesaid."

Thus the lien on all of appellants' real property interest

in Utah since the judgment date has been wrongful and should be corrected
by the decision in this case.
The foregoing goes to the procedure, form, and timing of the personal
judgment.

What about the substance thereof, especially the amount of the

judgment? Sec. 78-37-1 provides that the Court must adjudicate the Mamount
due."

Does that mean in a situation, such as this, where the sellers are

themselves buying on contract that the amount is the gross amount due
from the buyers or the net amount due?

Since the purchaser at the

sheriff's sale must satisfy the lien of the sellers' seller in order to
own the property it would constitute unjust enrichment for the buyers
to be subject to a deficiency judgment on the difference between the
gross sum due and the proceeds of the sheriff's sale since the latter
would be (or should be) based on the value of the property less the sum
owing to the sellers' seller (difference being that between gross and
net above).
In the instant case it is apparent that the sum found to be due was
the gross sum, not the net sum,and thus there was error in fixing that
amount.
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CONCLUSIONS
The trial court erred in entering any summary judgment before
trying the material facts that were genuinely disputed and in failing to
grant a new trial on the issue of the application of funds paid by
appellants to respondents• seller.

Respondents• Complaint did not state

a cause of action and the entry of judgment based on paragraph 16C of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract in question was error as there is no
proof in the record that respondents did "pass title to the Buyer
within the meaning of that term.

11

The entry of a personal judgment

against appellants was also in error as their interest in the subject
property has never been sold pursuant to Sec. 78-37-1, U.C.A. 1953, and
thus there has been no return of sale, a condition precedent to the docket-.
ing of any deficiency judgment as provided in the next section.

Therefore,

this cause should be remanded to the District Court of Utah County with
instructions to permit the filing of the proposed Amended Answer and to
try the case on its merits.
Respectfully submitted

/Q~~e~
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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